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Seven countries in Western Europe have enacted data protection laws. 2 Other countries contemplate legislation contained in reports or prepared by commissions. 3 International agreements also
4
have been discussed and prepared.
Although the United States was one of the first countries to enact data protection laws, many Americans today view European data
2. AUSTRIA: Federal Act of 18th October 1978 on the Protection of Personal
Data (Data Protection Act), BGB1 for the Republic of Austria, 28.11.1979, at 193 (English translation: OECD document DSTI/ICCP/79.11/02); DENMARK: Private Registers Etc. Act No. 293, Public Authorities Registers Act No. 294, both of 8th June 1978
(English translation by the Danish Ministry of Justice: OECD document
DSTI/ICCP/79.11/05); FRANCE: Act 78-17 of 6th January, [1978] J.O. 227 (English
translation: OECD document DSTI/ICCP/79.11/08); FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: Act on Protection Against the Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing,
Federal Data Protection Act, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) of 27th January 1977
(English translation: OECD document DSTI/ICCP/79.11/01); LUXEMBOURG: Law
of 31st March 1979 Regulating the Use of Personal Data in Information Systems, Memorial of the Grand Duche de Luxembourg A No. 29, 11.41979; NORWAY: Act of 9th
June 1978 Relating to Personal Data Registers (English translation: OECD document
DSTI/ICCP/79.11/14); SWEDEN: Data Act of 19th January 1977 (English translation
by the Swedish Data Inspection Board: OECD document DSTI/ICCP/79.11/18). The
English version of these data protection acts (except Luxembourg) have been collected in one source. See 2 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SOCIETIES, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS (1979).
3. See, e.g., BELGIUM: VANDERPOORTEN REP., Doc. 846, no. 1, 1975-1976 Senate
Session (April 8, 1976); NETHERLANDS: KOOPMANS Comm., PRIVACY AND PERSONAL
RECORDING (State Publishing Office, Gravenhage 1976), and GOVERNMENT COMM. ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY VIS-A-VIS PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, DRAFT BILL OF PER-

SONAL DATA SYSTEMS (November 30, 1976), reprinted in Committee of Experts on
Data Protection, Council of Europe, Information Doc. No. EXP/DATA PROT. (77) 2
(January 24, 1977) (unofficial translation); SPAIN: Preliminary Draft, Spanish Act on
Data Protection (1976), reprinted in Committee of Experts on Data Protection, Council of Europe, Information Doc. No. EXP/DATA PROT. (76)5; UNITED KINGDOM:
COMM. ON DATA PROTECTION, HOME OFFICE OF SEC'Y OF STATE, LINDOP REPORT, CMND.

No. 7341 (1978) (hereinafter LINDOP REPORT).
4. The European Parliament has passed recommendations for harmonizing data
protection on the EEC level. See REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN THE FACE OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PROCESSING, [19781979] Eut. PARL. DOC. (No. 100/79) (1979) (hereinafter PROTECTION REPORT). The
Council of Europe's Convention is open to signature. See Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Europ.
T.S. No. 108 (1981). The OECD has elaborated guidelines concerning the transborder
flow of personal data. See OECD document C(80) 58 (final), reprintedin Symposium
on TransborderData Flows and the Protection of Privacy, INFORMATION, COMPUTER
AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY SERIES (ICCP/OECD 1979).
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protection regulations with concern and even distrust.5 There is
growing concern that European regulations would be impractical,
bureaucratic, and detrimental to the free flow of information, especially with the impact these regulations would have on transborder
data flow. Leaving aside the particular problems of transborder data
flow, one reason for American concern seems to be that European
laws have some features that are unfamiliar to the American data
protection approach. These features include the implementation of
data protection agencies, the omnibus approach 6 and the recent inclusion of legal persons. 7 Americans assume that the growing
number of data protection agencies is creating a data protection bureaucracy that will make it difficult to benefit from the positive consequences of informational technologies.
Since, however, every European country with data protection
regulation has such an agency, a closer look at this European approach is worthwhile.8 It may seem presumptuous to talk about
"the" European approach, especially to those who daily have to deal
with data protection questions in the European environment; its
manifold differences almost constitute a new branch of comparative
law.9
An overview that identifies the general aspects rather than the
specifics of European regulations is necessary. A functional approach should provide such a cautious generalisation.1 0 Rather than
looking at specific regulations in detail, this approach identifies the
services that data protection laws, intentionally or unintentionally,
provide for society and the means by which this is achieved. A func5. See, e.g., McGuire, The Information Age: An Introduction to TransborderData
Flow, 20 JURiMETRiCS 1 (1979-80); Bigelow, Transborder Data Flow Barriers,id. at 8.
6. Seven American states, however, also use the omnibus approach. See THE
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY app. 1, at 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PPSC].

7. Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway have included legal persons in
their data protection legislation.
8. The installment of data protection institutions is not unfamiliar to the United
States. Arkansas has the Information Practices Board, Minnesota uses the Commissioner's Office of the Department of Administration, Ohio has the Personal Information Control Board and the Department of Administrative Services, and Utah uses
the Secretary of State's Office. See PPSC, supra note 6, app. 1, at 4, Lautsch, Digest
and Analysis of State Legislation Relating to Computer Technology, 20 JURIMETRICS
J. 201 (1979-80).
9. See, e.g., Bing, A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation, 2 Coup. L.Y.B.
149 (1978).
10. Since all European data protection laws lack a precise definition of privacy,
there was reason to assume that functions and procedures established by these laws
were at least as important as definitional decision criteria. One report discusses this
definitional dilemma. See LINDop REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.01-2.04.
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tional approach would then give a pattern of recognition so that the
various elements of such laws can be located more easily. Privacy
laws themselves, however, seem to be part of a far broader change
in the concept of law and legislation. Such general changes, which
seem to be caused by the growing impact of complex technologies,
will be discussed in part I. A description of the mechanics of data
protection laws will follow in part II. Part III will then look into the
specific role of data protection agencies against this background.
Since the functional approach tends to limit itself to describing how
elements interact to achieve a certain performance level for a given
system, part IV will attempt a broader evaluation. The evaluation
will be limited to the following issues: (1) what are the functionally
equivalent options to data protection agencies, i.e., what kind of
other mechanisms could provide at least similar services for societies facing informational technology; (2) what arguments actually
have led to the "European" choice; and finally, (3) what may be the
specific risks of this choice.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF 'TECHNOLOGY LAW"

Data protection laws can be seen as one answer to a particular
group of problems caused by the development of informational technology." Data protection regulations are thus part of a new type of
regulations caused by technological changes. Such changes call for
legislative processes that have two objectives:
*Society must adapt to technology to take advantage of the merits
of technological change.
eTechnology must be adapted to the basic values of society to ensure social coherence in a changing environment.
A regulatory mechanism must keep a proper balance between these
two objectives in order to achieve both technological progress and a
general acceptance of this progress.
Most data protection problems reflect "old" societal conflicts,
mainly over distribution of power between, for example, the individual (or groups of individuals) and the state, between consumer and
provider, or between employer and employee. The "new" technological element in these almost classic dualisms seems to pose
problems of a kind that no longer can be dealt with sufficiently by
existing traditional regulation of these relationships. This assumption is based partly on the observation of a new "language of
power." The traditional conflicts now are put in terms of information handling, i.e., access to information, distribution of information,
11. Other problems include changes in the structure of the labor market, interna.
tional, economic, and cultural dependencies, and system vulnerability.
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and capability to process information. Regulations thus have to
adapt to this new language in order to be accepted as adequate and
2
relevant conflict solutions.'
These new concepts also are based, however, on the strong practical impact of technology on traditional forms of information handling. Some observers even believe that this practical impact leads
to qualitative changes in social relationships. For example, the right
of access is one of the fundamental problems of data protection.
Before the rise of automated data processing, these rights of access
were discussed in terms of the particular relationship in which they
occurred; patient/doctor, employer/employee, and so on. Traditionally, they were discussed in terms of professional ethics, business
practises, contract law, and labor law. In the age of informational
and communications technology the same access to information
problems are discussed in terms of distribution of informational
power, because informational technology has enlarged the dimensions of these relationships in terms of quantity, space, time, and
participants. More information can be handled within these relationships in a shorter time, distance is almost irrelevant, and the
number of participants can be increased easily. Those who argue
for qualitative changes in handling access to information point to
the possibility of using algorithms, which formerly had been too
complex to use economically. This general increase in complexity
has made it impossible to monitor these relationships sufficiently.
This loss of orientation requires techniques that reduce complexity.
One of these techniques is the "data protection" right of access now
being carefully designed into the relevant information system.
The acceptability of conflict resolutions raises two questions:
*How can regulations adapt to change and still preserve basic, accepted values, or at least avoid drastic change?
-Do these regulations have to be laws?
Changes in informational technology are not the first technological
changes the legal system has had to face. The demands of modern
society already have led to a general change in the concept of law.
Legislation had to become part of the adaptive processes caused by
technological change so that social coherence could be maintained
and society's survival guaranteed. The problem, however, is the difficulty in steering demands. The economic system as main regulator
of technological progress tends to be difficult to influence, if such influence is desired at all. Also, the instruments of technology assess12. This is not only a "language" problem. The new language reflects new concepts of generating and distributing social power, which consequently need new concepts for checks and balances.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. Ia

ment are being developed and refined still and are far from being
perfected. As a result legislators have to regulate in an environment
of uncertainty. These difficulties have led to new types of laws.
Type one, usually occurring in an area where there is some
practical, technical experience, is called a "specific technology law."
This type of law employs technical terms and may contain special
measurement values to be achieved or not to be surpassed. Such
laws may read like technical manuals and are open to change with
technical progress. They usually are addressed to a small number
of the community, usually technicians in charge of handling the regulated technology. Type two, usually occurring in an area where
there is little practical, technical experience, is called a "general
technology law." Such laws are addressed to anyone who might
come into contact with the technology and they almost read like
political programs.
Both types are, of course, "ideal types" identified here for heuristic reasons, but very often new legislation is a mixture of both
types, e.g., privacy legislation. Both types are not fundamental, minimal rules addressed to the whole community to be obeyed for an
indeterminate period. Both types put legislators into a dilemma:
whether the area is dynamic (type one) or underdeveloped (type
two), there is a certain urge "to do something about it." Legislators
cannot delay because many individuals fear that data processing
technology will invade their privacy and violate other civil rights.
Legislative action is needed because only laws can sufficiently
convince doubters that the technology should be accepted, and only
laws can provide adequate compromises for social conflicts in democratic societies. It is, however, very often difficult to know what to
do and what consequences a particular measure may have, so the
legislator would prefer to learn rather than to legislate. Sensor
mechanisms that watch the regulated area and give feedback to the
legislator must be created in order to increase knowledge.
H. THE ROLE OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS
This new concept of law ("specific technology law" versus "general technology law") explains many of the striking features of privacy laws, e.g., the astonishing combination of very general and very
specific regulations (the latter mainly with regard to data security or
procedural questions), the reluctance to define privacy as such, the
tendency to have specific regulations (for specific sectors of application, e.g., health records) in addition to general rules, and the expressed intent to review the law regularly and to learn from the
developments. Privacy laws thus can be described by the functions
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they perform, specifically by the way they reconcile basic values
with technological change and by the way they provide for educating the participants in the legislative system.
A.

BASIC FUNCTIONS

The complexity of information processing is reduced if the data
subject understands the information environment. All data protection laws, therefore, include provisions that, though by different
means, require the user to disclose either general or specific information to the data subject, e.g., where personal information is being
processed, where the user obtained the information, and where the
user will send the information. The means by which a data subject
can obtain this information differ according to the approach of the
particular law; the information can be found in general directories,
the data subject can demand the information directly from the user,
or the law can require the user to provide the information after specific transactions or on a periodic basis.
While openness is the prerequisite, the actual reconciliation of
informational conflicts has to be achieved by balancing mechanisms.
Since the concept of technology laws does not contemplate deciding
all possible conflicts in advance, each specific law has to provide a
mechanism by which different interests can be sufficiently discussed, balanced, and then decided. Data protection laws provide
for two basic balancing mechanisms: the implied and the explicit
analysis of conflicting informational interests. Implied analysis occurs when the specific data protection regulation allowing or prohibiting information handling already contains a process of analysis
and balance. Explicit analysis occurs when a particular handling of
data is not regulated by a law and its implied mechanism for balancing conflicting interests.
Personal data generally may be processed if the data subject
has given his/her express consent. The law simply assumes that
the data subject has given his/her informed consent, i.e., the person
concerned has weighed the competing interests for him/herself and
13
has come to the conclusion that processing should be favored.
Since it would be too complicated to ask for or to provide such consent any time personal data is going to be processed, another implication generally is included in the consent mechanism. In other
words, no express consent is necessary if the data subject has reason to assume that personal data is going to be processed in a par13. Further problems, such as whether the data subject had "real" freedom to refuse consent, and such as what constitutes "informed" consent, have been discussed
widely in data protection literature and will not be discussed here.
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ticular social situation, e.g., in a contractual relationship. It is
assumed in such a case that consent to the particular social interaction is tantamount to consent to the handling of information.
Apart from these personal or social situation orientated mechanisms, one finds implicit interest analysis mechanisms in special
laws. These mechanisms are usually in the form of explicit handling
regulations in the data protection law itself, usually for particular
sectors (e.g., mail address companies in Denmark), in special data
protection laws (e.g., The Credit Reporting Act in Sweden), or in
"unspecific information laws" (laws that cover information handling
inter alia, e.g., tax laws that contain regulations for information
transfers from the private to the public sector). The implicit interest analysis principle applies here because it is assumed that the
legislators have specifically weighed the prospective interests of the
persons involved in a specific information relationship against the
interests of those who are to give or receive that data. 14 The decision reached by the legislators is legitimate, therefore, under the
principles of democracy.
In many cases, however, there is data handling without the consent of the data subject and without a legal mechanism for balancing the conflicting interests. Such transactions occur frequently and
range from trivial (e.g., a company collects addresses for marketing
by mail) to serious (e.g., two or more insurance companies combine
the file of an individual suspected of making dubious claims). There
must be explicit analysis in these cases. Since neither the person
concerned (consent mechanism) nor the legislator (specific law
mechanism) undertakes the balancing in a specific information relationship, the data user or a special body must perform the task.
Sometimes, but not always, data protection laws provide guidelines
for striking the balance, but because of the generality of the legal
terms, it is debatable whether the user has to carry the risk (if it becomes a court case) or an appointed body has responsibility for
making the decision.
Finally, it is obvious that the mechanisms of balancing interests
14. The "specific law solution" is the cause of many misunderstandings regarding
the European approach to data protection. Although the data protection laws of

Western Europe take an omnibus approach (in contrast to the sectoral approach of
the United States), they do not override other regulations regarding the handling of
personal information. In Germany, for example, the data protection law explicitly
states that it is subordinate to specific regulations that are contained in other statutes. Many regulations regarding employer/employee information relationships con-

sequently are found in labor or similar statutes or in cases interpreting those
statutes. The implied or explicit subordination, however, poses specific problems of
interpretation that cannot be dealt with here.
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define the quantity and kind of data as well as the interests of those
participating in the communication process. Since interest analysis
demands the discussion of the purpose of particular data handling
in a particular context, any decision in favor of processing is limited
by that particular purpose: there must be new and specific analysis
for any other purpose. One finds in all these laws, therefore, rules
that demand a rationalization and a minimization of data handling
according to the particular purpose the information transfer is
designed to serve.
B.

BASIC

APPROACHES

Explicit interest analysis and balancing must be implemented.
Among the options available for implementing these principles, alternatives emerge. The law can require (1) the user to register or to
obtain a license (ensuring openness); or (2) the user to police himself (substantive approach).
The substantive approach leaves it up to the user to see that the
principles of data processing are duly applied. In such a system,
openness usually can be achieved only by allowing a right of access
or by using a rule that requires notice to the persons concerned because there is no administrative process for collecting general information. The other approach demands that a special procedure be
followed before a personal fie may be established. Such a procedure may vary from strict licensing to simple registration. In order
to obtain a license, details of the system would have to be provided
concerning the kind of data, the mechanisms for ensuring correctness and for providing access to the person concerned, the responsible personnel, the regular recipients, and the purpose of the data
collection or communication. An appointed authority would then
check whether the principles and mechanisms described were being
followed (the authority also usually rules on the acceptability of the
system). The license generally would be issued upon payment of a
fee, limited to a prescribed time, and revoked for any modification of
the system. A registration system would require a registration authority with the same powers as listed above, but the system could
begin operating at the moment of registration or as soon as the user
receives a receipt. The authority usually has no discretion to refuse
registration, but in some cases one may be asked, however, to explain the system further.
Describing data protection laws in an "ideal type" manner was
necessary to understanding the context in which data protection
agencies operate. In practice, however, all data protection systems
with which this Article is concerned contain a mixture of balancing
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mechanisms and approaches. Implied balancing in the form of consent is very common in private sector regulations and the "specific
law mechanism" is used mostly in the public sector. Explicit analysis and balancing usually is used for specific information systems or
user groups that process sensitive information. The Swedish system, usually associated with the licensing approach, in fact accepts
registration for the more common personal files provided the general regulations set up by the data protection authority are being
followed. The German system, regarded to be the prototype of a
substantive approach, nevertheless asks for the registration of specific user groups in the private sector.
III. THE ROLE OF DATA PROTECTION INSTITUTIONS
The functions usually associated with data protection agencies
in Western Europe include providing openness, undertaking interest
analyses, making explicit balancing decisions, and performing registration and licensing procedures. Before further analyzing how
these institutions perform the functions assigned to them by the
various laws, a short survey on existing institutions shall be
15
presented.
A.

DATA PROTECTION AGENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPEA BRIEF SURVEY

Austria
The Austrian data protection law created the Data Protection
Commission and the Data Protection Council. The Council consists
of representatives from political parties in the Federal Parliament,
from the Federal State, the Laender, and the local communities,
from private enterprise interest groups, and from employees' organizations. The Council oversees the general development of data protection and has the right to investigate data processing in the public
sector in order to judge its lawfulness. The Council also serves as a
forum for general discussion and submits a report to parliament
once every two years.
The Data Protection Commission consists of four members that
are nominated by the government and appointed by the President.
It has the right to be heard regarding regulation of personal data
processing in the public sector. It administers the register for both
15. Only a short survey can be given here. A more detailed survey, if only of the
state of the art in Sweden and EEC countries as of 1979, is available. See 2 H.
BURKERT, THE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE OF DATA PROTECTION AGENCIES, EEC
JOINT STUDY ON DATA SEcuRrY AND CONFIDENTIALrTY (1980).
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the public and the private sector, but the National Statistical Authority, which has to be consulted if registration is refused, keeps
the register. The Commission handles complaints against public
sector data processors and assists in handling complaints against
private data file keepers. The complainant, however, must follow
6
regular court procedures.'
Denmark
Denmark has separate laws for the private and the public sector, but the control authority, the Data Surveillance Authority, has
jurisdiction over both sectors. The agency consists of a Council and
a Secretariat. The Council has seven members who are appointed
by the Minister of Justice, and the Secretariat was slated to consist
of twenty-five members in 1980. The Council makes decisions of a
general nature and supervises the work of the Secretariat, which executes day to day business.
In the public sector, the Data Surveillance Authority supervises
all data banks to which the Public Registers' Act refers. It gives its
opinion regarding changes in the law, projects installing data banks,
and fie matching between public data banks. It also has the right to
investigate complaints. In addition, the Authority can ask for specific information about public data banks that are set up by directives from a ministry. An annual report must be given to the Danish
Chamber of Deputies.
In the private sector, the Authority ensures that the regulations
of the Private Registers' Act are kept. Specifically, the Authority
gives its opinion on intended modifications of the law, it investigates
complaints, and it keeps a register on credit information and computer service bureaus. The decisions rendered by the Authority can
be challenged in competent courts.
France
The Data Protection Commission (Commission Nationale de
l'Informatique et des Libertes) consists of seventeen members, each
appointed by various state organs. 17 The Commission is supported
by an administrative department that employed about twenty people in 1980. The Commission draws up simplified regulations for the
most common forms of personal data processing in both the public
16. Further details are available. See K. BEDNAR & M. WEISsENBOECK, DATENSCMUTZHANDBUCH (1979).
17. The Commission's own report supplies further details. See RAPPORT DE LA
COMMSSION NATIONALE DE L' NFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTES, Bn AN ET PERSPECTWES,
LA DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE (1980).
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and the private sector. In the public sector, it gives its opinion on
new laws or regulations establishing personal files. 18 In the private
sector, the Commission receives a notification of intent to set up
personal files that has to be acknowledged. In cases involving a simplified procedure, the Commission receives only a simple
declaration.
FederalRepublic of Germany
The data protection system of Germany is somewhat complicated because of its federal nature. There are three different types
of data protection agencies. The federal level public sector is controlled by Federal Data Protection Commissioner, who applies the
federal data protection law. The various Data Protection Supervisory Agencies, which are part of the Laender administration control
the private sector by applying the same federal data protection law.
The Laender Data Protection Agencies (sometimes commissioners
or a board) control the public sector on the Laender level according
to the specific Land's data protection law. 19 The Federal Data Protection Commissioner's office, which is of main interest here, had
about thirty employees in 1979/80.
The control authority (the Federal Data Protection Commissioner) keeps a register on personal files in the public sector on the
federal level and deals with complaints from the public. It ensures
cooperation between the various data protection authorities and
gives advice in data protection matters. The control authority carries out inspection and can admonish public authorities, through
their supervising authorities, in order to ensure that data protection
measures are enforced. Finally, the control authority gives an annual report to the German Parliament.
Luxembourg
The tasks of data protection agencies are shared between the
competent ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Justice), which acts as a
data protection agency in the proper sense, and the "Commission
consultative," which, as the name indicates, has a consulting function. The Luxembourg data protection law establishes a licensing
system for the private sector. The licenses are administered by the
18. This is more than the usual "opinion" since a negative decision can be overruled only a decree from the Conseil de l'Etat.
19. In addition, there is a system of internal control in the private sector. Firms
performing a specified level of personal data processing must appoint data protection
commissaries. This is mainly a counterpart to the substantive nature of the data protection law and the relatively limited power of the supervisory agencies.
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competent ministry and entered into the National Data Bank Register, which also contains information on the personal file systems of
the public sector. These systems can be established only by law or
decree, and only after the systems have been assessed by the Consultative Commission. Investigations and interventions in both the
public and the private sector can only be made, however, by the
competent ministry. Infringements have to be reported to the criminal prosecution authorities.
The five members of the Consultative Commission are appointed by the Grand Duke, represent the public and private sector,
and include computer scientists and legal experts. The Commission
has the power to initiate research and is required to supply general
information about data protection and information technology questions, to advise the government, and to give an annual report.
Norway

2o

The data protection agency for Norway, the Data Inspectorate, is
a seven person board that, in April, 1980, included four executive officers, two office personnel, and the director. The primary public
sector function of the Inspectorate is to give opinions on drafts of
new statutes that relate to data protection issues. In the private sector, the Inspectorate administers concessions for all electronically
aided personal data registers and such non-electronic personal data
registers that store sensitive information (e.g., medical information).
Registers in the public sector that are not covered by specific statutes and that are not exempted explicitly fall under the same jurisdiction of the Data Inspectorate as private registers. The
Inspectorate also may establish more precise rules, or may modify
or make exemptions from specific rules that concern all other personal registers or specific types of registers. Additionally, the Data
Inspectorate keeps a register on all these data ffies and has a broad,
though not absolute right to inspect them. Finally, any decision
made by the Inspectorate may be appealed through the Ministry of
Justice.
Generally, the Inspectorate must keep informed of developments regarding data protection issues and, in this respect, it must
give advice and guidance to parties who are planning to establish
registers. The Inspectorate also must ensure that the data protec20. Detailed descriptions of the Norwegian system abound. See Foyen,
Implementation of the Norwegian Personal Data Registers Act, 2 INFORMATION
PRrVAcY 190 (1980); Selmer, Norwegian Privacy Legislation, 1 INFORMATION PRIVACY
178 (1979); Focus on Norway and Sweden, 1 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. (1978).
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tion regulations are observed, and that errors and deficiencies are
rectified.
Sweden
Sweden's data protection authority is the Data Inspection
Board. The actual board supervises the activities of an administrative department (comprised of about thirty persons at the beginning
of 1980). The board includes the director, representatives from the
political parties and unions, and experts in public administration,
computer science, and medicine.
The Data Inspection Board keeps a register on personal files in
both the public and the private sector. The Board administers the
private sector licensing system, which may require either a standardized or a specialized procedure, depending on whether the file
for which a license is sought comports with the more common forms
of personal fies or whether it is considered unique. The same regulations apply to fies in the public sector; if, however, the public sector was set up by law or directive, the Board must be consulted
regarding fie specifications. Finally, the Data Inspection Board has
the right to investigate complaints and make inspections on its own
account. Appeals from decisions of the Board are to be decided by
the Ministry of Justice.
B.

GENERAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE CONCEPT

OF "TECHNOLOGY LAW"

The general features of technology law, as described in part I,
include the need to make the legislative system learn. This need
can be satisfied by establishing a sensor that reacts to difficulties in
implementing data protection regulations. A specific sensor is
needed if data protection regulations are embodied in a "steering"
system. At the present stage of regulation, however, sensors are
needed more for knowledge than for actual steering, so data protection agencies collect information, monitor general developments,
and report their findings to the legislators or the government. Registration and licensing procedures provide further special information.
Changes deemed to be necessary by the sensor must be communicated to the appropriate authorities and also to the users, the
subjects, and the public. Data protection agencies, in which knowledge and expertise about data protection is concentrated, perform
this task on several levels and by several means. They educate the
general public by participating in forums, by producing brochures,
and by making media appearances. They educate users by issuing

DATA PROTECTION INSTITUTIONS

1981]

.181

informational booklets or manuals, 21 or by supplying specific information when discussing a particular licensing application. They
give data subjects a general education or they give advice in specific
cases. Finally, they advise governments and legislators and thus
participate in making information policy.
C.

SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE MECHANISM OF DATA
PROTECTION LAWS

Apart from these general functions, agencies also act within the
specific demands of privacy law, providing openness, analyzing and
balancing interests and, not yet mentioned in this context, exercising control. Openness usually is provided by establishing records
on personal files systems and by making them accessible to the general public. Data protection agencies balance interests in the public
sector by giving their opinion on the law or directive that implements the personal information system. They are involved, therefore, in the "implicit interest analysis" while legislation is being
drafted. In the private sector, the agencies perform "explicit interest analysis" whenever they modify or refuse applications.
Although the control function has not been referred to in the
general context of technology law nor in the specific context of privacy law, its existence is self-evident. This function, at least in its
isolated form, has drawn much attention, but it tends to be of less
importance in everyday practice because the main function of a
"type two" technological law is to learn. Strict control may close informal information channels, which in turn may lead to wrong or
"overemphasized" decisions. Such decisions may endanger co-operation and jeopardize acceptance by the users. Co-operation is necessary for agencies to operate with efficiency. 22 Consequently,
representatives from data protection agencies emphasize their advisory functions: when conflicts arise, they seem to prefer bargaining
to prohibitive measures.
Ironically, providing openness and balancing interests necessitates some control. The regulatory agency can no longer be left
21. The Federal Data Protection Commissioner in Germany, for example, has circulated more than 60,000 copies of his information brochures. It is one of the "bestselling" (it is free) governmental information booklets. The Swedish Inspectorate
has gone as far as printing data protection information on milk packages.
22. Problems usually are sorted out in direct discussions with the authorities.

This may be due to the fact that both parties depend on each other during the implementation period. "Friendly" administration is not altogether unproblematic since it
may weaken the authorities' ability to achieve general acceptance. A research project
of the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law currently is looking into
this problem.
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without control because the usual authorities may lack sufficient
flexibility or the specialized knowledge needed to administer control. Not surprisingly, data protection agencies find themselves in a
difficult position: they must balance a flexible and cooperative policy with control. Neglecting control would endanger the credibility
of data protection laws and would make acceptance by data subjects
impossible. One of the main arguments for an institutional approach is that such a balance can best be kept by a separate institution with special expertise and capability.
How can a data protection agency achieve control technically?
As pointed out in the brief survey, data protection agencies have a
general right to inspect, either directly or by applying to the proper
juridical authorities. Considering their limited resources, these
agencies have been relatively effective in their inspection procedures thus far. One reason for this success seems to be their concentration on organizational deficiencies during their inspections.
Such faults, though relatively easy to detect, are of vital importance
for the decision output of such organizations. Preventive control,
i.e., the agencies' influence on subsequent licensing or registration
decisions, also helps to reduce the need for inspections. The public's right of access and public's ability to call in the agencies if there
is reason for suspicion provide additional control and further reduce
the need for inspections.
IV. AN A'ITEMPT TO EVALUATE THE
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
Legislators who wish to learn from the experiences of other
countries, and the history of data protection in Western Europe is a
good example of legislators helping each other, would like to know if
there are viable alternatives to data protection agencies. Though
some general problems of data protection have led to similar general
solution structures, such a question is connected too closely to the
political and legal traditions of any one country to have a clear answer. Any evaluation of this question, therefore, can be only of a
general nature. Some functionally equivalent options that, to a certain extent, have been discussed in the reports preceeding data protection legislation, will be discussed briefly. There are, however,
some consequences that deserve broader attention since they may
lead to a long term change for the data protection agencies or for the
entire system of information control. These consequences might
flow from the relationship between data protection agencies and the
traditional institutions of political power.
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A. FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT OPTIONS AND REASONS FOR THE
INSTITUrLONAL CHOICE

Considering the general functions of technology laws and the
specific functions of data protection laws, the choice not to institutionalize data protection can mean having these functions performed by existing institutions, or it can mean relying on noninstitutional mechanisms. The usual method of implementing a law
is to leave it to the juridical power to oversee the law. None of the
existing Western European laws excludes the possibility of seeking
the help of the courts or some other body to override the decision of
the data protection agencies. Only the Austrian law states explicitly
that, in the private sector, the data subject him/herself has to seek
the help of the courts; the Data Protection Commission can only
give assistance. The Western European Community apparently
does not regard courts as functionally equivalent options, especially
in light of their reliance on additional safeguards.
Not installing special agencies and relying exclusively on the
courts also would imply a purely substantive approach. The courts
would be left to act as the only sensors and advisers unless the
traditional information collecting agencies (e.g., statistical offices) or
advisory institutions (e.g., chambers of commerce, consumer aid,
and user organizations) agree to split these tasks among them.
Since this is often very costly and time consuming, another option
has received wide attention: the self-regulating mechanism. 23 In
such an approach, users or groups of users set up their own institutions or hand over the desired tasks to existing ones already under
their administration. These institutions would regulate the proper
handling of personal information and would give any assistance
needed. These solutions have received much interest, especially in
countries with experience in strong self-regulating professional
standards, because such methods could foster development of ethical standards from within rather than from enforcement from
without.
The prevailing regulatory philosophy of Western European legislators, however, is evident in the following statement: "[The government] opted for the strict, bureaucratic solution, well aware that
it would cost more and might hamper administrative activities ....
'Because of anxiety that many people probably feel vis-a-vis the
modern personal data registers,

. . .

it is important to keep the de-

velopment under control as much as possible.' "24 Though the con23. See Kling, Models for the Social Accountability of Computing, TELECOM.
POL'Y, Sept. 1980, at 166.
24. See Selmer, supra note 20, at 180.
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trol function seems to be less important in practice, it was believed
that a separate and independent body, rather than the courts, would
be better suited for the delicate task of balancing interests in order
to make a new technology acceptable. As an added advantage, the
agencies would act to focus the issues for the courts if the courts
were subsequently needed.
The decision in favor of the institutional approach, therefore,
has to be seen in close connection with the social mood that helped
create the new technology law. The social mood is important to the
analysis simply because the legislative action was deemed necessary in the first place only because the problem area was regarded
as sensitive or at least as having the potential for important social
conflict. Since the effect of these laws had to be constantly watched,
and since the legislature itself could not keep in touch with these
developments, a functional need arose for an appropriate institution
that, at the same time, would help in reassuring the public that
"somewhere someone" was taking care of the problem area.
B. A

PROBLEM AREA OF THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH: DATA
PROTECTION INSTITUTIONS AND TRADITIONAL INSTrTUTIONS OF

POLICAL POWER
The discussion of the relationship between courts and data protection agencies points directly to a fundamental problem area: the
relationship between data protection agencies and traditional institutions of political power. 25 For practical reasons, the traditional
model of the division of power between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary shall be maintained as a reference model,
though it is no longer valid in this clear abstract form. Keeping in
mind the weaknesses of the reference model, three general assumptions may be made:
" Data protection agencies will concentrate and amplify political
power to a great extent;
* This concentration and amplification will lead to conflicts with
the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers;
• In the course of these conflicts, the institutional approach that
has been implemented so far will need some fundamental
reworking.
Concentration and amplification can be explained in the following manner. Information policy is becoming more and more important as its security and economic implications are being realized.
25. See Burkert, Datenschutzbehoerden als Kontrollinstanzender Information? in
INFORMATIONS-SYSTEME FUER DIE 8OIGER JAHRE 354 (1980).
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Data protection is a part of, though not always a well integrated
part, of information policy. Integration is difficult partly because the
area to be regulated by the agencies, though defined to some extent
by data protection laws, can never be completely defined since the
concept of "technology law" contemplates these agencies needing
and using maneuvering space. This is the only way that the agencies can keep track of technological change, can remain flexible
when balancing interests, and can adapt to the specific character of
data protection.
In the course of performing their mandates, data protection
agencies combine acts of policy planning with acts of policy making,
individual decision making, and control. They play a part in policy
planning because they have accumulated expertise to an extent that
no policy maker can. They make policy whenever they give advice,
or whenever they prescribe or recommend types of personal systems. They make specific decisions whenever they refuse or modify
licenses or registrations. In other words, various forms of political
power are concentrated in these agencies.
Power is not only concentrated but amplified by the ability of
the agencies to adapt to the information environment. The agencies
are superior to the more traditional forms of public administration
in the way that they use their powers. Their personnel, who can be
chosen more freely by the leading officials of these institutions, usually combine skills from the legal and information sciences, a combination that seems to be well suited to solving problems of
informational technology. Representatives of these agencies are
able to talk the "information language," to present and solve
problems of information power, and to accumulate even more practical experience. They use informational technology themselves in
managing their various tasks. They can be judged, therefore, at
least for the time being, to be better prepared to handle problems of
information power in a societal context than other parts of the public sector.
The role of data protection agencies in the public sector has not
be analyzed sufficiently yet. Current international surveys concentrate on the role of data protection agencies in the private sector in
order to attract the interest of international users. Most analysts
would agree, however, that there are two general ways that these
agencies exercise influence in the public sector. They participate in
the development of governmental or public administration personal
files and/or they control the existing systems. This usually puts the
agencies in a difficult position: in theory, they are part of the executive branch, yet they are supposed to counterbalance concepts of efficiency with the interests of the persons concerned. In addition,
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they must check and possibly challenge administrative procedures.
As such, they perform internal control for the executive branch.
Other institutions that perform similar functions in public administration systems (e.g., budget control) are in a similar position. Like
these institutions, data protection agencies must take precautions to
try to avoid being taken hostage by the administration. Although
the agencies are sometimes technically established within the administrative structure of a ministry, their head officials usually have
judicial status, which makes it impossible to remove them from office for any reason other than those that would make a judge unfit
for office. By reporting to the legislature, the agencies can
strengthen their position generally and ensure that the general public is aware of important conflicts. Other administrative units cannot overrule their decisions.
Reports of these agencies suggest that conflicts with the administration, and thus with executive power, play an important role in
everyday operations of data protection agencies. These conflicts
seem to play a more important role than the conflicts created by
other internal control mechanisms, mostly because publicity is assured by the reporting mechanism and also because the area of information processing receives intense attention from the general
public. The fact that issues of state security are often at stake in
such conflicts adds to the attention. These reasons, however, also
may lead the data protection authorities to seek mechanisms of conflict regulation that do not attract too much publicity, to be cooperative in order to realize their concepts to some extent, and to calm
down controversies. At the same time, however, they are reminded
continually that their credibility is at stake since they can only
achieve acceptance if they can be trusted to offer sufficient resistance. In sum, conflicts with the executive play a vital role in the
performance of data protection agencies and much attention should
be given to the possible solutions of such conflicts.
Conflicts between data protection agencies and the judicial
power have received little attention so far. It generally is assumed
that no such conflicts occur since all decisions of the data protection
agencies can be challenged in court, in court-like institutions, or at
the highest administrative level. In fact, only the Austrian law has
given the matter some attention by clearly defining the advisory role
the Data Protection Commission plays in the private sector. Other
data protection laws do not contain such explicit emphasis, which
seems to indicate that no specific conflict has been noted. Conflict,
however, may not be totally avoided. Data protection agencies presently may exercise impact on court decisions, even if only as advi-
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sors, as long as judicial expertise has room for growth and external
advice is difficult to obtain.
The data protection agencies' selective function in taking legal
action is of equal importance. This does not necessarily influence
the role of judicial power since specific bodies normally are assigned
a selective role, but it may have an impact on the data protection
agencies themselves. The agencies may feel reluctant, at least for
the present time, to bring specific cases into court because they
want to avoid decisions by "unprepared" courts that may have a restrictive influence on their practice. As a result, data protection
agencies may prefer out of court settlements as long as they feel a
lack of experience and as long as they wish to probe their own field
of operation. This function of "mobilizing law" will need further
attention.
The main source of possible conflict, however, lies in the relationship between data protection agencies and the legislature. As
previously explained, data protection agencies have a broad margin
for decision. This implies a certain power of interpretation that may
lead to a deviation from the intentions of the legislature. Even
though they received their legitimation from the legislature, data
protection agencies can become relatively independent because the
necessities of technology law demand wide agency discretion.
Courts and administrative agencies always exercise discretion when
they interpret law, but the margin in this area is relatively broad,
the power of the agencies is relatively strong, and the area in which
these agencies operate is extremely important because of its infrastructural character.
Many legislatures may have anticipated possible conflict since
some of the Western European models include a strong connection
between data protection agencies and the legislature. This "connection" may consist of organizational orientation toward the respective
parliamentary bodies, either by making the agencies' responsible to
parliament, by making the agencies report to parliament regularly,
or by appointing members of the parliamentary body to the agency
boards. These assumptions are directed toward the future and it remains to be seen how the participants of possible power conflicts
will react to these developments. The problems, however, have
26
been realized by countries that are contemplating legislation.
26. The legislative character of codes of practice has been a controversial issue.
See, e.g., LINDOP REPORT, supra note 3. In Germany, the expertise function in the
area of social security research recently was given to the social security administration itself instead of to the Federal Data Protection Commissioner. The European
Parliament has stressed the importance of including the parliament in any institutional model for data protection in the EEC. See PROTECTION REPORT, Supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION
The "European approach" to data protection, and the implementation of data protection agencies in particular, must be viewed inclose connection with the prevailing public mood toward informational and communications technology. Although not fundamentally
hostile toward technological change, the public has taken a more
cautious attitude. This attitude most likely is connected with past
abuses of information and communication power and with present
consciousness of the cultural implications on a multilingual continent. Such an attitude makes legislators sensitive to value problems
involved in technological change, particularly in informational and
communications technology. Their legislation, therefore, tends to
use a cautious approach, trying to learn while trying to reconcile
structural changes with prevailing traditional values in order to
avoid abrupt changes. In the still highly specialized area of informational and communications technology, legislators felt it necessary
to hand over these learning and reconciling functions to specialize
institutions rather than to leave them with traditional ones. This
may become, in the long run, the cause of future conflicts; at present, however, these institutions seem to perform reasonably well.
One can envision, nevertheless, a time when these specialized institutions of information control may become obsolete, when general
awareness of the value problems of information and communication
technology will have been achieved, when public and private users
alike will have made their systems sufficiently open, and when the
individual or any group of individuals will feel sufficiently confident
and equipped to participate in communication no matter how complex the technology may be.

These are signs of the rising sensitivity to the political power of data protection
agencies.

